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TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN
NAFTA’S REPLACEMENT: AN OLD
GAS GUZZLER GETS A PAINT JOB
GEOFFREY GARVER1
I. INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)2 is now his-
tory, and, depending on where you are, as of July 1, 2020, the Canada-
United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) in Canada,3 the United-
States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) in the United States,4 or the Tratado
entre México, Estados Unidos y Canadá (T-MEC)5 is in force.6  The re-
negotiation of NAFTA fulfilled candidate Donald Trump’s promise to
scrap or renegotiate NAFTA in order to protect and restore United States
1 Dr. Geoffrey Garver was Director of Submissions on Enforcement Matters at the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) in Montreal from 2000-07, and was a member of
the CEC’s Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) for the United States from 2010-13. He
currently teaches environmental law and policy at Concordia University and is a researcher at
McGill University in Montreal.
2 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289.
3 See Government of Canada, A New Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, https://
www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-
aceum/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2021). In French, it is called l’Accord Canada-États-Unis-
Mexique (ACEUM). Id.
4 See Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), United States-Mexico-Ca-
nada Agreement, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-ca-
nada-agreement (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
5 See Government of Mexico, Tratado entre México, Estados Unidos y Canadá (T-MEC)
(Spanish only), https://www.gob.mx/t-mec (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
6 One is left to wonder why the three countries were unable to agree on a single name for the
pact in English, and why the agreement’s official name makes no reference to trade or investment,
leaving a vague but false impression that it deals comprehensively with all matters of mutual con-
cern to the signatories. One set of commentators observed that “[t]he seemingly trivial brand-name
change from NAFTA to USMCA evinces a deeper problem of deinstitutionalization,” or weakening
of the post-Cold War international order more broadly. Gustavo A. Flores-Macı́as & Mariano
Sánchez-Talanquer, The Political Economy of NAFTA/USMCA, OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF POLITICS 17 (Aug. 28, 2019), https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/
9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1662. This article will refer to the agreement
as NAFTA’s replacement or CUSMA-USMCA.
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jobs and industrial capacity and increase economic growth,7 themes that
consistently helped define his trade agenda politically as President.8  But
what about the environment?  When NAFTA was finalized early in the
Clinton Administration in 1993, North American environmental groups
insisted that the agreement address their concerns that liberalized trade
and investment would lead to environmental dumping, environmental
backsliding, weak environmental enforcement and scale effects (i.e.,
more trade equals more environmental impact).9  The environmental pro-
visions of NAFTA and its environmental side agreement, the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),10 re-
sponded to many of those concerns, at least on paper, and set the broad
contours of United States trade and environment policy ever since.
Broadly speaking, rising socio-economic trends such as population,
gross domestic product (GDP), foreign direct investment and many kinds
of production and consumption, correlate strongly with rising ecological
impacts, such as climate change, loss of biodiversity and other pressures
on critical planetary boundaries of safe operating space for humanity.11
Consistent with this correlation, while NAFTA and its progeny have
taken effect over the past three decades, the aggregate ecological impacts
of human activity, with international trade a major driver, have worsened
according to many key measures.  Within the hierarchy of planetary
boundaries, climate change and biosphere integrity are reasonable prox-
ies for broad-scale ecological impact because they are global-scale
boundaries that are “highly integrated, emergent system level phenomena
. . . connected to all of the other [boundaries].”12  From January 1994 to
January 2021, the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide measured
7 Emily Stephenson & Amanda Baker, Trump Vows to Reopen, or Toss, NAFTA Pact with
Canada and Mexico, REUTERS (June 28, 2016, 3:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
election-idUSKCN0ZE0Z0; Mary E. Burfisher et al., NAFTA to USMCA: What is Gained?, (IMF,
Working Paper No. 19/73, Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/03/
26/NAFTA-to-USMCA-What-is-Gained-46680.
8 DAN CIURIAK, HOW U.S. TRADE POLICY HAS CHANGED UNDER PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP
– PERCEPTIONS FROM CANADA (Mar. 29, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3362910.
9 See Geoffrey Garver, Forgotten Promises: Neglected Environmental Provisions of the
NAFTA and the NAAEC, in NAFTA AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: HISTORY, EXPERIENCE AND
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 15 (Hoi L. Kong & L. Kinvin Wroth eds., 2015); Linda J. Allen, The
Environment and NAFTA Policy Debate Redux: Separating Rhetoric from Reality, 42 WILLIAM &
MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 965, 970-71 (2018).
10 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), Sept. 14, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1480.
11 See Will Steffen et al., Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Chang-
ing Planet, 347 SCIENCE 1259855, 1259855-8 (2015); Xuemei Bai et al., Plausible and desirable
futures in the Anthropocene: A new research agenda, 39 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 351
(2016).
12 Steffen et al., supra note 11, at 8.
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at Mauna Loa rose sixteen percent, from to 358.24 ppm to 415.28 ppm.13
Biodiversity loss, measured by risk of species extinction, overall species
abundance or biodiversity intactness, steadily worsened over this period
as well.14  International trade has contributed significantly to this loss of
biodiversity, particularly as higher-income countries have increased their
consumption of goods from lower-income countries where habitat loss
and other threats to biodiversity are especially severe—as in Mexico and
other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean.15  Trade has also fac-
tored significantly in the ongoing rise in ecological footprint globally, in
North America, and in Canada, Mexico and the United States individu-
ally since 1994, despite some relative (but not absolute) decoupling of
some ecological impacts from trade-related consumption.16
So, what kind of environmental provisions would a new NAFTA,
negotiated with no evident consideration of these broad regional and
global ecological trends, at the insistence of a climate skeptic, environ-
mentally insouciant President backed initially with Republican majorities
in both houses of Congress, include?17  In the end, the NAFTA’s replace-
ment made no radical changes for better or worse in regard to the envi-
ronment.  Indeed, the agreement has been described as mostly “old wine
in a new bottle.”18  The agreement brings North American trade and en-
vironment policy more or less in line with post-NAFTA trade agreements
of the three countries without changing the basic structure for approach-
ing trade and environment that, with some small tweaks, has been in
place since NAFTA.  And, that is precisely the problem.  The trade and
environment policy regime of CUSMA-USMCA perpetuates an ap-
proach that remains blind to, and ineffective in confronting, the most
pressing ecological challenges that global and regional trade and invest-
ment help drive.
In this article, I will first review, analyze and critique the key
changes that NAFTA’s replacement made to the environmental provi-
13 Monthly CO2, Mauna Loa CO2: January 2021, CO2 EARTH, https://www.co2.earth/
monthly-co2 (last visited Mar. 23, 2021). See also QUENTIN KARPILOW ET AL., NAFTA: 20 YEARS
OF COSTS TO COMMUNITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 6 (Mar. 2014) (noting that from 1990 to 2005,
greenhouse gas emissions rose by 17% in the United States, 26% in Canada and 37% in Mexico).
14 See WWF, LIVING PLANET REPORT 2020: BENDING THE CURVE OF BIODIVERSITY LOSS 28
(R.E.A. Almond et al., eds., 2020) (Switz.) (hereinafter LPR 2020).
15 See LPR 2020, supra note 14, at 17-20, 52.
16 WWF, LIVING PLANET REPORT 2008 28-29 (Chris Hails et al. eds., 2008) (Switz.). For
more detail regarding the rising ecological footprint in North America, see discussion infra Section
III.A.
17 See Ruth Zavala, El ACAAN y sus instituciones como catalizadores de la gobernanza
ambiental en Meéxico: del TLCAN al T-MEC (The NAAEC and Its Institutions as Catalysts for
Environmental Governance in Mexico: From NAFTA to the USMCA), 15 NORTEAMÉRICA 9 (2020).
18 Flores-Macı́as & Sánchez-Talanquer, supra note 6, at 16.
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sions of NAFTA and the NAAEC.  I will then explain why the environ-
mental provisions of CUSMA-USMCA and its ancillary Environmental
Cooperation Agreement (ECA),19 like the environmental policy approach
typical of post-NAFTA trade and investment agreements, are woefully
inadequate for helping to solve urgent challenges, like climate change
and loss of biodiversity, that the human enterprise faces in these ecologi-
cally dire times.
II. COMPARISON OF CUSMA-USMCA’S ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS
TO THOSE OF NAFTA AND NAAEC
Like nearly all post-NAFTA trade and investment agreements in-
volving at least one of the NAFTA parties, the CUSMA-USMCA in-
cludes an environment chapter,20 no longer relegating environment
largely to a side agreement.21  Only time will tell whether this change
will give greater weight to the environment in the North American trade
arena or will lead to party-to-party enforcement of environmental matters
that are now subject to the agreement’s dispute resolution provisions.22
However, there are many reasons for suspecting that the environmental
revisions in NAFTA’s replacement will have only modest impact, at
best.
A. ADOPTING, MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING ON HIGH LEVELS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Akin to the sailor’s trick of tying many knots if you do not know the
right one, the parties loaded NAFTA and the NAAEC with many over-
lapping efforts to stymie any conceivable effort to make the adoption or
maintenance of ever higher levels of environmental protection in North
America in any way enforceable.  Both NAFTA and the NAAEC made
19 Agreement on Environmental Cooperation among the Governments of Canada, the United
States of America, and the United Mexican States (ECA) (2019), https://www.international.gc.ca/
trade-commerce/assets/pdfs/agreements-accords/cusma-aceum/cusma-ECA.pdf (hereinafter Envi-
ronmental Cooperation Agreement).
20 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement art. 24, Sept. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement (hereinafter CUSMA-
USMCA or ECA).
21 I.e., the NAAEC.
22 For a cautiously optimistic perspective, see Anne-Catherine Boucher, The USMCA Con-
tains Enhanced Environmental Protection Provisions but Will They Lead to Substantive Environ-
mental Protection Outcomes?, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Nov. 20, 2020), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/ierl/20201120-the-
usmca-contains-enhanced-environmental-protection-provisions/. Canada’s and the United States’
self-serving environmental reviews are also quite optimistic about the agreement’s environmental
provisions; see discussion infra Section II.C.
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the desire for ever-improving environmental standards explicit policy.  In
NAFTA’s preamble, the parties stated their aim “to strengthen the devel-
opment and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations,”23 and
in the NAAEC preamble they noted “the importance of the environmen-
tal goals and objectives of the NAFTA, including enhanced levels of
environmental protection.”24  The NAAEC also included the agreed ob-
jective to “foster the protection and improvement of the environment in
the territories of the Parties for the well-being of present and future gen-
erations.”25  Yet, these statements of policy objectives would need teeth
to make them credible and meaningful.
The text of NAFTA and the NAAEC clearly did not provide those
teeth, despite the use of “shall” in regard to some of the relevant man-
dates.  The requirement in NAAEC article 3 that each party “shall ensure
that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of environmental
protection” is fatally qualified by the parties’ recognition in the same
article of each party’s “right to establish its own levels of domestic envi-
ronmental protection and environmental development policies and priori-
ties, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and
regulations.”26  Further, article 3 requires only that each party “shall
strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations,”27 a hobbled
mandate that is likewise subject to the parties’ right to establish or mod-
ify their domestic levels of environmental protection.  Article 906(2) of
NAFTA, which suggested a policy of upward harmonization of North
American health, environmental and safety standards, diluted any man-
date to do so with language that the parties “shall, to the greatest extent
practicable, make compatible their respective standards-related mea-
sures, so as to facilitate trade in a good or service between the Parties.”28
NAFTA article 714(1) uses nearly identical language with regard to sani-
tary and phytosanitary measures.29  The strongest suggestion of a policy
of non-regression in either NAFTA or the NAAEC, in NAFTA article
1114(2), avoided the use of “shall” altogether and provided party-to-
party consultations as the sole remedy:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment
by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures.  Ac-
cordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or
23 NAFTA Preamble.
24 NAAEC Preamble.
25 NAAEC art. 1(a) (emphasis added).
26 NAAEC art. 3.
27 Id. (emphasis added)
28 NAFTA art. 906(2) (emphasis added).
29 NAFTA art. 714(1).
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offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an en-
couragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention
in its territory of an investment of an investor.  If a Party considers
that another Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request
consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult
with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.30
When NAFTA was adopted, these environmental “mandates” were
widely seen to be mere aspirational policy statements.31  Not surpris-
ingly, then, these provisions of NAFTA and the NAAEC have been en-
tirely ineffectual in preventing environmental backsliding in Canada,
Mexico and the United States, all of which have done so,32 or in ensuring
significant upward harmonization of North American environmental
standards.33  Indeed, despite numerous instances of weakening of envi-
ronmental laws and regulations among the NAFTA parties, no party has
ever sought consultations or even developed a means for tracking the
other parties’ compliance with this soft mandate.34
In contrast, the CUSMA-USMCA jettisoned any ambition for up-
ward harmonization of environmental standards but retained soft require-
ments for the parties to achieve high levels of environmental protection
of their own choosing and to avoid environmental backsliding.  Article
24.3 preserves the unenforceable mandate to “strive” for high levels of
environmental protection,35 as well as the qualification that each party
reserves its sovereign right “to establish its own levels of domestic envi-
ronmental protection and its own environmental priorities, and to estab-
lish, adopt, or modify its environmental laws and policies accordingly.”36
However, CUSMA-USMCA chapters 9 (Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures) and 28 (Good Regulatory Practices), undercut any objective
30 NAFTA art. 1114(2) (emphasis added).
31 See Garver, supra note 9, at 25-26.
32 See id. at 22-25; GEOFFREY GARVER, ECOLOGICAL LAW AND THE PLANETARY CRISIS: A
LEGAL GUIDE FOR HARMONY ON EARTH 193-95 (2021).
33 See Halil Hasic, Article 1110 of NAFTA: Investment Barriers to Upward Harmonization of
Environmental Standards, 12 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 137, 139 (2005). Nonetheless, successes such
as Mexico’s phase out of DDTs and its adoption of a national pollutant release and transfer inven-
tory, the Registro de Emisiones y Transferencia de Contaminantes, akin to Canada’s National Pollu-
tant Release Inventory and the United States’ Toxics Release Inventory are noteworthy. See
Government of Mexico, Registro de Emisiones y Transferencia de Contaminantes (RETC), https://
www.gob.mx/semarnat/acciones-y-programas/registro-de-emisiones-y-transferencia-de-contaminan-
tes-retc.
34 During the author’s time on the JPAC from 2010 to 2013, it became clear through informal
discussions with government representatives that no systems were in placed to track other parties’
performance in this regard. In addition, a search of relevant government websites revealed no evi-
dence of such efforts.
35 CUSMA-USMCA, art. 24.3(2).
36 CUSMA-USMCA, art. 24.3(1).
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of strengthened environmental measures with provisions that prohibit
such measures from being any stronger than necessary.37  In essence, the
CUSMA-USMCA, like nearly all contemporary free trade agreements,
adopts a reverse precautionary approach, whereby instead of promoting
precaution to ensure that environmental measures are not too weak, it
promotes trade-protective precaution to ensure that they are not too
strong.
In addition, the “should” in NAFTA’s toothless article 1114(2) be-
came a “shall” in CUSMA-USMCA article 24.4(3), which states that “a
Party shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or
otherwise derogate from, its environmental laws in a manner that weak-
ens or reduces the protection afforded in those laws in order to encourage
trade or investment between the Parties.”38  As well, the remedy for envi-
ronmental regression under article 24.4(3) is full dispute resolution under
CUSMA-USMCA’s chapter 31 on dispute settlement, not consultations
as under NAFTA article 1114(2).39  Yet, that has been the case for many
of Canada’s and the United States’ post-NAFTA trade and investment
agreements,40 which have incorporated environmental chapters with sim-
ilar language directly into the agreement and not relegated them to a side
37 See, e.g., CUSMA-USMCA art. 9.6(2) (“Each Party has the right to adopt or maintain
sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal, or plant life or
health, provided that those measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Chapter”) (em-
phasis added). Those other provisions include requirements to adopt the least trade restrictive mea-
sures possible. See CUSMA-USMCA arts. 9.6(10), 9.13(8). In general, CUSMA-USMCA chapter
28 is replete with bureaucratic procedures that seem aimed at rendering the adoption or maintenance
of regulations more time-consuming and difficult, with one objective being to “avoid unnecessary
restrictions on competition in the marketplace” (art. 28.4(1)(f)). For example, the parties are required
to have in place processes for assessing regulatory impacts (art. 28.4(1)(e)), to publish a list of
anticipated regulations a year in advance with an indication of any expected significant impact on
international trade and investment (art. 28.6), to develop a website dedicated to providing the infor-
mation required under chapter 28 (art. 28.7), to expand opportunities for comments on regulations
and to evaluate all such comments in writing (art. 28.9), and to have a process for retrospective
reviews of regulations with a view to modifying or repealing them on its own initiative or at the
request of any interested person (arts. 28.13, 28.14). One commentator concludes that Chapter 28 is
a big win for multinational corporations and that it “places significant burdens on regulatory agen-
cies that are, in many cases, already under-resourced.” Kyla Tienhaara, NAFTA 2.0: What are the
implications for environmental governance, 1 EARTH SYSTEM GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (2019).
38 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.4(3).
39 CUSMA-USMCA art 24.32.
40 See, e.g., US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement art. 18.3(2); US-Panama FTA art. 17.3(2);
KORUS FTA art. 20.3(2); Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement art. 20.3(6); Canada-Colombia FTA
art. 1702; Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement art. 24.5(2). Some U.S.
agreements, such as CAFTA-DR and the US-Chile FTA, use the weaker “shall strive to ensure”
instead of “shall.” See CAFTA-DR, art. 17.2(2); US-Chile FTA, art. 19.2(2). See generally Free
Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
free-trade-agreements (last visited Mar. 31, 2021); and Trade and Investment Agreements, GOVERN-
MENT OF CANADA, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-com-
merciaux/agr-acc/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
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agreement like the NAAEC.  Not surprisingly, neither Canada, the
United States nor any of their trading partners has ever initiated a dispute
regarding weakened environmental laws under provisions akin to
CUSMA-USMCA article 24.4(3).  Not only would a such a claim require
proof that a waiving or derogation of an environmental law (terms that
the agreement does not define or contextualize) was done in order to
promote trade or investment, but the party making the claim would also
have to contend with other provisions, such as CUSMA-USMCA article
24.3, that give the parties wide discretion to choose and modify (i.e.,
strengthen or weaken) the level of environmental protection they deem
appropriate.
Chapter 24 of CUSMA-USMCA actually is replete with party man-
dates regarding the environment, expressed using “shall”, that are now
technically subject to dispute settlement under chapter 31.  For example,
each party “shall promote public awareness of its environmental laws
and policies,”41 “shall provide for the receipt and consideration of writ-
ten questions or comments from persons of that Party regarding its im-
plementation of this Chapter,”42 “shall” ensure that certain procedures
are available to redress environmental harms,43 “shall take measures to
prevent the pollution of the marine environment from ships,”44 “shall
take measures to prevent and reduce marine litter,”45 “shall” encourage
corporate social responsibility and responsible business conduct,46 “shall
promote and encourage the conservation and sustainable use of biologi-
cal diversity, in accordance with its law or policy,”47 “shall seek to oper-
ate a fisheries management system that regulates marine wild capture
fishing,”48 “shall” promote the conservation of marine species,49 “shall”
take action to end certain fisheries subsidies,50 and “shall” cooperate or
exchange information on a number of topics.51  However, nearly all of
these “shall” mandates are either not of a nature that would likely lead to
a trade dispute or contain modifying language that makes them virtually
unenforceable.  Additional weaknesses of the mandates in chapter 24 are
discussed below, in connection with the provisions on environmental en-
41 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.5(1).
42 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.5(2).
43 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.6.
44 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.10(1).
45 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.12(2).
46 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.13.
47 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.15(2).
48 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.18(1).
49 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.19.
50 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.20.
51 See, e.g., CUSMA-USMCA arts. 24.15(6) (biodiversity), 24.21(2)(g) (illegal fishing),
24.22(2) (illegal trade in species), and 24.23(5) (forest management).
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forcement, environmental impact assessment and multilateral environ-
mental agreements.
B. ADDRESSING WEAK OR INEFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT
The CUSMA-USCMA retains, with some modifications, the two
primary mechanisms in the NAAEC for addressing concerns that a party
is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law: (1) the submis-
sions on enforcement matters (SEM) process, which allows North Amer-
ican persons or organizations to seek preparation by the CEC Secretariat
of a detailed factual record regarding allegations of ineffective environ-
mental enforcement by a party;52 and (2) the party-to-party dispute reso-
lution process in NAAEC Part V, which allowed a party to seek remedies
for another party’s persistent pattern of failing to effectively enforce its
environmental law.53  In the case of the SEM process, the CUSMA-
USMCA and the ECA include modest revisions regarding follow up to
factual records.  They allow the new Environment Committee54 and the
Council to consider cooperative activities that respond to information in
factual records,55 and the CUSMA-USMCA requires the parties to “pro-
vide updates to the Council and the Environment Committee on factual
records, as appropriate.”56
These mostly cosmetic changes to the SEM process fail to address
the most prominent concerns that users and observers of the process have
raised since its inception.  The chief concern is that the process lacks
adequate independence from the parties, acting individually or collec-
tively as the Council, to be credible and effective.57  Party or Council
interference with the independence of the process, and the Secretariat’s
role in administering it, has occurred most egregiously in Council votes
on whether to authorize the Secretariat to prepare a factual record for a
submission and in factual record instructions where one is authorized.
52 See NAAEC art. 14, 15; CUSMA-USMAC art. 24.27, 24.28.
53 See NAAEC art. 22 et seq.; cf. CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.4(1), (2).
54 See discussion infra Section II.E.
55 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.28(7); ECA art. 4(1)(m).
56 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.28(8) (emphasis added). This language effectively makes the
provision of updates discretionary, not mandatory. Based on experience to date following revised
SEM guidelines adopted in 2012 with similar language, it is likely that these updates will rarely if
ever be provided. See Council Ministerial Statement (July 11, 2012) (revised guidelines “call for
Parties to follow up on concluded submissions with information on any new developments and
actions taken regarding matters raised in such submissions.”)
57 See GARVER, supra note 32, at 200; Paul Stanton Kibel, Awkward Evolution: Citizen En-
forcement at the North American Environmental Commission, 32 ENV’T. L. REP. News & Analysis
10769 (2002) passim.
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For example, in the case of several submissions, the Council has either
voted against preparation of a factual record or issued instructions, typi-
cally drafted by the party whose environmental enforcement is the target
of the submission, that significantly diverged from what the submission
asked for and what the Secretariat recommended.58  In the Species at
Risk submission involving Canada, the scope of the factual record au-
thorized by the Council diverged so significantly from what the Submit-
ters requested and what the Secretariat recommended that the Submitters
withdrew the submission instead of allowing a distorted factual record to
be published.59  Because of these concerns, the JPAC informed the
Council in 2011, following a survey, that the credibility and utility of the
process as an independent accountability mechanism was seriously
eroded in that many environmental NGOs found the process did not pro-
vide information they were seeking or resolve their concerns.60  The
modest changes made in the CUSMA-USMCA and the ECA do virtually
nothing to address the most serious flaws in the SEM process, the most
prominent of which is the built-in conflict of interest61 that parties face as
both targets and (through the Council) active manipulators and overseers
of the process.
Under the regime of NAFTA and the NAAEC, Part V of the
NAAEC never came to life.  Canada, Mexico and the United States never
adopted the rules of procedure for Part V required under NAAEC Article
28 or established a roster of Part V arbitrators as required under NAAEC
58 GARVER, supra note 32, at 200; JPAC, Advice to Council 11-04 — Submissions on En-
forcement Matters (SEM) and Cross Border Movements of Chemicals in North America 2 (Decem-
ber 7, 2011), http://www.cec.org/files/documents /jpac_advice_council/jpac-advice-11-04-en.pdf
(“JPAC advises the Council that its focus . . . should be on the timeliness and accessibility of the
process, on giving more deference to the Secretariat’s independent recommendations and interpreta-
tions in the process, and on follow-up to factual records”) (emphasis added).
59 Letter from Devon Page, Ecojustice, to Evan Lloyd, CEC Secretariat (Jan. 17, 2011), http://
www.cec.org/wp-content/uploads/wpallimport/files/06-5-not_en.pdf.
60 JPAC, Advice to Council 11-04, supra note 58.
61 See Garver, supra note 9, at 26; JPAC, Advice to Council 03-05 — Limiting the scope of
factual records and review of the operation of CEC Council Resolution 00-09 related to Articles 14
and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 3 (Dec. 17, 2003), http://
www.cec.org/files/documents/jpac_advice_council/jpac-advice-03-05-en.pdf (noting “an emerging
perception of Council being in conflict of interest” and recounting public testimony at a JPAC meet-
ing that “Council is having a hard time differentiating their role-when they are acting as a Council
and when they are acting individually as Parties”); Geoff Garver, Tooth decay 25 ENV’T F. 34, 38
(May/June 2008) (“Providing the CEC secretariat with greater discretion to define the scope of
factual record investigations would address a fundamental concern about the process: the inherent
conflict of interest that the NAFTA governments face in being both council members who vote on
factual records and also, since the council is composed of the three countries’ environmental minis-
ters, targets of individual submissions.”); David Markell, The Role of Spotlighting Procedures in
Promoting Citizen Participation, Transparency, and Accountability, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 425,
440 (2010).
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Article 25.  Further, no party to the NAAEC has ever initiated a Part V
dispute with another party, just as no government party to any of the
myriad post-NAFTA agreements62 with this type of provision targeting
persistent failures to effectively enforce environmental law has ever initi-
ated such a dispute.  This wholesale failure to use Part V and similar
provisions is most likely because of serious structural flaws in the dis-
pute process, especially key definitions and burdens of proof.63  In par-
ticular, a successful party claimant would have to defeat exceptions for
bona fide decisions to allocate enforcement resources to higher priority
matters and for reasonable exercise of enforcement discretion, as well as
to prove a sustained or recurring course of action amounting to a persis-
tent pattern of weak environmental enforcement linked to trade.64  De-
spite a risible clarification in the CUSMA-USMCA that sustained or
recurring failure to effectively enforce environmental law is presumed to
be “in a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties, unless
the responding Party demonstrates otherwise,”65 disputes regarding such
failures of environmental enforcement are likely to remain “a Pandora’s
box no government is likely to open.”66
C. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Chapter 24 of CUSMA-USMCA includes new language making it
mandatory for each party to have “appropriate environmental impact as-
sessment procedures for assessing the environmental impact of proposed
projects that are subject to an action by that Party’s central level of gov-
ernment that may cause significant effects on the environment,”67 and
that these include provisions for public disclosure of information and
public participation.68  Putting aside that the word “appropriate” renders
this language effectively unenforceable, the need for this provision is
elusive, because Canada, Mexico and the United States all have had en-
vironmental impact assessment requirements for their federal govern-
62 See, e.g., US-Colombia FTA, Articles 18.3(1), 18.12; DR-CAFTA, Articles 17.2(1), 17.10;
US-Peru TPA, Articles 18.3(1), 18.12; US-Panama TPA, Articles 17.3(1), 17.11; US-Chile FTA,
Articles 19.2(1), 19.6; US-Australia FTA, Articles 19.2(1), 19.7; Canada-EU Comprehensive Eco-
nomic and Trade Agreement art. 24.5(3); Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership art. 20.3(4); Canada-Colombia Agreement on the Environment art.2(2).
63 See NAAEC art. 22 et seq.
64 See Garver, supra note 9, at 27-28.
65 CUSMA-USMCA, art. 24.4(1) note 5.
66 Garver, supra note 9, at 28 (quoting Geoff Garver, Tooth Decay, 25 ENV’T. F. 34, 39
(May/June 2008)).
67 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.7(1) (emphasis added).
68 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.7(2).
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ments since before NAFTA.69  Moreover, the agreement excludes sub-
national levels of government, whose projects can elude federal require-
ments,70 and strategic or regional environmental impact assessments of
policies and programs, which are mandatory at the federal level in the
United States but not in Canada or Mexico.71  If the intent was to pre-
serve the mandate in the NAAEC requiring each party to “assess, as ap-
propriate, environmental impacts,”72 the governments opted to weaken
the requirement by referring only to federal projects rather than
strengthen it by expanding it explicitly to include sub-national levels of
government and strategic impact assessment.
Ironically, both Canada and the United States conducted environ-
mental impact assessments of the CUSMA-USMCA,73 both of which fall
far short of the gold standard for rigorous and objective scientific impact
assessment designed to identify and avoid or mitigate significant envi-
ronmental impacts.  The United States Trade Representative’s (USTR’s)
environmental review,74 conducted without the rigor generally applied
under NEPA, is more of a pro-USMCA public relations pamphlet than a
credible environmental impact assessment.  It mostly touts the expected
benefits of the environmental provisions that were included, states that
no significant negative environmental impacts were identified and glar-
ingly excludes analysis of climate impacts, despite a few references to
pre-existing binational or trinational cooperation on some climate issues
69 Canada may have sought to include this provision, which it has included in some post-
NAFTA agreements. See, e.g., Canada-Colombia Agreement on the Environment art. 2(5).
70 Negotiation of the Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (TEIA) agreement
called for under NAAEC Article 10(7) collapsed in 1999, in part because of Mexico’s concern that a
Texas low-level nuclear waste site, which was subject to state environmental assessment law but not
NEPA, would not be covered by a TEIA agreement. Because such a project would trigger a federal
environmental impact assessment in Mexico, the Texas example revealed a serious lack of reciproc-
ity among the parties. See Geoffrey Garver & Aranka Podhora, Transboundary Environmental Im-
pact Assessment as Part of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. 26
IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT APPRAISAL 253, 259 (2008).
71 In the United States, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) mandates environ-
mental impact assessment for major federal actions, which includes programs and policies. 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). In Canada, regional and strategic impact assessments are discretionary. Impact
Assessment Act (S.C. 2019, c. 28, s. 1) §§ 92, 95(1). Mexico has no federal mandate to conduct
strategic environmental assessments for federal policies or programs.
72 NAAEC, art. 2(1)(e).
73 The author could find no environmental assessment of T-MEC by Mexico.
74 USTR, Final Environmental Review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(2019), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/usmca/USMCA_Final_Environmental_
Review.pdf. The review was conducted not under NEPA, but under the Clinton-era Executive Order
13141, which includes language that insulates environmental reviews of trade agreements from judi-
cial review. E.O. 13141 § 7 (Nov. 16, 1999). In Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representa-
tive, 5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1041 (1994), the D.C. Circuit held that
negotiation of trade agreements such as NAFTA is not subject to judicial review, effectively pre-
cluding application of NEPA to trade agreements.
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that will continue after the agreement is in force.75  And Canada’s envi-
ronmental review is dated July 14, 2020,76 two weeks after CUSMA-
USMCA took effect.  Thus, one can hardly expect it to have met the core
objective of environmental assessment to consider potential impacts
early in the decision-making process so any important environmental im-
pacts can be avoided or mitigated.  Instead, it appears to be mostly a
post-hoc analysis and justification of the agreement.77  The review notes
that “CUSMA generally carries forward the key provisions of NAFTA,
including virtually tariff-free market access, and therefore important en-
vironmental considerations of relevance to North American trade are not
expected to change significantly with the transition to the new Agree-
ment.”78  Despite this forecast of no significant change from NAFTA and
the exclusion of climate change in the CUSMA-USMCA, the review op-
timistically concludes:
Based on the environmental impact studies undertaken on NAFTA, as
well as on the qualitative chapter-by-chapter assessment of the envi-
ronment-related provisions under CUSMA, this report finds that
CUSMA’s impacts on the environment will be more positive than
NAFTA as the new Agreement is expected to strengthen environmen-
tal protection and governance practices in North America.79
D. ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
THROUGH CUSMA-USMCA
The CUSMA-USMCA goes beyond NAFTA, which gave three
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) qualified precedence
over NAFTA,80 by referring to a longer list of seven MEAs81 and requir-
ing each party to “adopt, maintain, and implement laws, regulations, and
75 USTR, supra note 74.
76 Government of Canada, Final Environmental Assessment of the Canada-United States-
Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (July 16, 2020), https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/as-
sets/pdfs/agreements-accords/cusma-aceum/final_ea-ee_finale-en.pdf.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 3.
79 Id. at 4. The environmental review is entirely devoid of any rigorous explanation or justifi-
cation for this expectation.
80 NAFTA art. 104. The listed agreements included the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol), and the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention), which  pre-
vailed over inconsistent provisions of NAFTA “to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that
where a Party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying
with such obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is the least inconsistent with the other
provisions of this Agreement.” NAFTA art. 104(1).
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all other measures necessary to fulfill its respective obligations” under
them.82  This party obligation is enforceable through the agreement’s
party-to-party dispute settlement provisions, as long as the alleged viola-
tion is “in a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties.”83
This is one of the more significant new enforceable provisions, although
whether and how any such violations will be addressed through the dis-
pute settlement mechanism, and whether the arbitrators to any such dis-
putes will be competent to adequately address claims regarding MEAs,
remains to be seen.  Moreover, the exclusion of the Paris Climate Agree-
ment from the list of MEAs, along with the absence of other significant
provisions in the agreement regarding mitigation of or adaptation to cli-
mate change, is a glaring omission.84
E. ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE
Although the CUSMA-USMCA and the ECA retain the CEC Coun-
cil,85 the CUSMA-USMCA also establishes an Environment Committee
“composed of senior government representatives, or their designees, of
the relevant trade and environment central level of government authori-
ties of each Party”86 whose purpose is to oversee implementation of
Chapter 24.87  By contrast, the CEC Council is made up of “the cabinet-
level or equivalent representatives responsible for environmental affairs
of the Parties, or their designees.”88  The CUSMA-USMCA calls for the
Environment Committee to meet within one year of the July 1, 2020,
entry into force of the agreement,89 but as of April 2021, the committee
81 The seven listed MEAs are “the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora, done at Washington, March 3, 1973, as amended; the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done at Montreal, September 16, 1987, as adjusted and
amended; the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollu-
tion from Ships, 1973, done at London, February 17, 1978, as amended; the Convention on Wetlands
of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, done at Ramsar, February 2, 1971, as
amended; the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, done at Can-
berra, May 20, 1980; the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, done at Washing-
ton, December 2, 1946; and the Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission, done at Washington, May 31, 1949.” CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.8(4).
82 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.8(4).
83 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.8 note 6.
84 See Press Release, NRDC, NAFTA Rewrite Fails Key Climate Test (Dec. 9, 2019), https://
www.nrdc.org/media/2019/191209.
85 See NAAEC arts. 8-10 (Part III).
86 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.26(2).
87 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.26(3).
88 ECA, art. 3(1).
89 CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.26(4).
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does not appear to have been established.90  The agreement leaves much
to be clarified in regard to the relationship between the Environment
Committee, whose focus appears to be Chapter 24,91 and the Council,
whose focus appears to be the ECA.92  Whether these two trinational
committees will be complementary or conflictual remains to be seen; cer-
tainly, the formal inclusion of trade-related officials on the Environment
Committee could lead to conflicts with the more environmentally ori-
ented Council, although pre-existing domestic interagency processes
within the federal governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States
already provide fertile ground for such trade and environment conflicts.
F. TRI-NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
The ECA, which is parallel to the CUSMA-USMCA, maintains the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) established under the
NAAEC and its three main constituent bodies, the Council, the Secreta-
riat and a smaller Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC).93  The
Council retains its broad authority to establish the strategic priorities and
work program of the CEC, and the ECA identifies the following initial
priorities for cooperation: “[s]trengthening environmental governance;”
“[r]educing pollution and supporting strong, low emissions, resilient
economies;” “[c]onserving and protecting biodiversity and habitats;”
“[p]romoting the sustainable management and use of natural resources;”
and “[s]upporting green growth and sustainable development.”94  Over-
all, the CUSMA-USMCA does not set in motion any major changes in
the functioning or structure of the CEC.
90 Neither the USEPA nor the Environment and Climate Change Canada webpages that list
the committees related to the CUSMA-USMCA’s environmental provisions included the Environ-
ment Committee in early April 2021. USEPA, International Cooperation, https://www.epa.gov/inter-
national-cooperation/epas-role-north-american-commission-environmental-cooperation-cec (last
visited Apr. 7, 2021); Government of Canada, International Affairs and the environment, https://
www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2021). However, in an e-mail communication with the author, the Government of Canada
indicated that plans for holding the first formal meeting of the Environment Committee prior to July
1, 2021, were underway as of the end of March 2021. E-mail from CUSMA Inquiry, Global Affairs
Canada, to Geoffrey Garver (Mar. 30, 2021).
91 See CUSMA-USMCA art. 24.26(3).
92 See ECA art. 4.
93 ECA art. 2. The JPAC must now consist of at least nine members, instead of fifteen as the
NAAEC mandated. ECA art. 6.
94 ECA art. 10(2).
15
Garver: NAFTA GETS A PAINT JOB
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2021
54 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 13
G. MODIFICATION OF THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE MECHANISM
The CUSMA-USMCA includes significant changes in regard to in-
vestor-state disputes that were possible under NAFTA Chapter 11.95
NAFTA Chapter 11 included an unprecedented waiver of sovereign im-
munity that allowed a private investor to sue a NAFTA government in
arbitration that bypassed national judicial systems if the investor believed
the government treated the investment unfairly under NAFTA’s invest-
ment rules, and environmental groups have highlighted evidence that
these investor-state disputes have undermined environmental regulation
and protection in North America.96  Most notably, the CUSMA-USMCA
phases out investor-dispute settlement between Canada and the United
States, thereby removing in part the potentially chilling effect that those
disputes can have on strong environmental laws and regulations.97
Nonetheless, they are retained with some modifications for Mexico and
the United States, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement includes
an investor-state dispute mechanism that applies to Canada and Mexico
as signatories to that agreement.98  Although the diminution in the scope
of investor-state disputes in the CUSMA-USMCA takes away one ave-
nue for private entities to create a chill on environmental regulation, the
inclusion of new regulatory obstacles in Chapter 28 mitigates this gain,99
especially because they are backed with the possibility of party-to-party
dispute settlement through Chapter 31.  How much of a meaningful dif-
ference the changes in the investor-state dispute mechanism will make
remains to be seen.
H. OTHER PROVISIONS
One interesting new feature of CUSMA-USMCA is the sunset
clause in Chapter 34, under which the agreement expires after 16 years
unless the parties explicitly agree to extend it for another 16 years.100
Although this clause has been criticized for creating business uncertainty
95 See NAFTA arts. 1101-39 (Part V).
96 See KARPILOW ET AL., supra note 13, at 7-9.
97 See GARVER, supra note 32, at 201; KARPILOW ET AL., supra note 13, at 8-9 (quoting a
Canadian government official who related examples of U.S. law firms representing industry clients
raising Chapter 11 concerns in pressuring the Canadian government to back off a wide range of
regulations).
98 See Tienhaara, supra note 37, at 2.
99 See id. at 2-3.
100 CUSMA-USMCA art. 34.7.
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that could impede investment among the three countries,101 it could ben-
efit the environment if it prevents locking in ecologically harmful long-
term investments driven by the GDP growth imperative or other eco-
nomic considerations.  Another novel feature of CUSMA-USMCA is a
provision that allows a party to adopt or maintain measures deemed
“necessary to fulfill its legal obligations” toward Indigenous peo-
ples102—as long as the measure is “not used as a means of arbitrary or
unjustified discrimination against persons of the other Parties or as a dis-
guised restriction on trade in goods, services, and investment.”103  Given
the hurdles environmental measures have faced historically when chal-
lenged as discriminatory or as disguised trade restrictions,104 it is too
soon to assess whether this qualified nod to the rights of Indigenous peo-
ples is more than an optical illusion.105  Last, the CUSMA-USMCA also
eliminated the energy proportionality clause that prevented Canada from
reducing the proportion of energy exports to the United States.106  This
added flexibility for Canada is an environmental improvement in the
agreement.
III. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TOWARD ECOLOGICALLY
SUSTAINABLE TRADE AND INVESTMENT
Brigham Daniels coined the term “tragic institutions” to refer to in-
stitutions designed to address an environmental Tragedy of the Com-
mons problem that themselves become tragic in that they lack the
authority, capacity or flexibility to fulfill their original objectives or to
adapt to new information and circumstances.107  They are tragic not only
101 David A. Gantz, Important New Features in the USMCA, Rice University’s Baker Insti-
tute for Public Policy Issue Brief (May 5, 2020), https://www.bakerinstitute.org/files/15846/; Flores-
Macı́as & Sánchez-Talanquer, supra note 6, at 16.
102 CUSMA-USMCA art. 32.5.
103 Id. As with Chapters 9 and 28 with respect to environmental measures, the language quali-
fying this exception suggests a reverse precautionary approach that could inhibit strong protections
for Indigenous peoples.
104 See Daniel C. Esty & James Salzman, Rethinking NAFTA: Deepening the Commitment to
Sustainable Development, in A PATH FORWARD FOR NAFTA 125, 127 (C. Fred Bergsten & Monica
de Bolle eds., 2017) (discussing environmentally problematic GATT rulings in the 1990s tuna-
dolphin and shrimp-turtle cases).
105 Id. (contending that NAFTA softened the requirement that environmental measures be the
least trade restrictive option such that no challenges to such measures have been pursued under
NAFTA, and the same might be true with respect to measures to meet obligations to Indigenous
peoples).
106 See M. ANGELES VILLEREAL & IAN F. FERGUSSON, THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO-CANADA
AGREEMENT (USMCA) 19, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, No. R44981 (July 27, 2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44981.
107 Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENV’T LAW 515, 539
(2007).
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because they are ineffective wastes of public resources, but also because
they block the adoption of better alternatives for the policy space they
occupy.  In North America, no better example exists than the environ-
mental regime of NAFTA and now CUSMA-USMCA, which can be
lumped together as a continuum of failure, because CUSMA-USMCA
represents another tragedy: the rare and now wasted opportunity to learn
the right lessons about the gross inadequacy of the original NAFTA envi-
ronmental regime and make a serious change in course.
A. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY OF NAFTA’S REPLACEMENT
Trade and investment agreements like CUSMA-USMCA are nego-
tiated first and foremost from the perspective that trade generates wealth
and opportunity for many as it spreads goods, services, capital and infor-
mation around the world.108  This is the narrative in which the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the World Trade Organization
(WTO), relevant pronouncements of the G20 nations and the United Na-
tions, and regional trade arrangements such as the European Union and
NAFTA are rooted.  Globalized trade and finance are cornerstones of the
globally dominant growth-insistent economic system in which protection
of private property rights and state sovereignty and limited regulation of
ever-expanding market regimes are strongly and presumptively favored
and environmental protections are limited, secondary and ultimately
woefully inadequate.109  Indeed, the resistance of the international trade
policy community to even including environmental concerns in trade
agreements, which persisted into the 1990s and lingers still, is well
known.  The mounting dilemma is that the dominant paradigm for trade
and investment continually perpetuates and locks in a fundamental lack
of scientific understanding and appreciation of the ultimate impossibility
of its implicit assumptions about ecological sustainability and of the key
role of international trade and finance as drivers of significant and wors-
ening ecological impacts on Earth’s ecosystems.110  Falling far short of
bringing a needed end to this ecological illiteracy in the international
trade and finance regime,  CUSMA-USMCA represents yet another lost
108 See Oran Young et al., The Globalization of Socio-Ecological Systems: An Agenda for
Scientific Research, 16 GLOBAL ENV’T CHANGE 304, 307-310 (2006).
109 See Rachel Beddoe et al., Overcoming Systemic Roadblocks to Sustainability: The Evolu-
tionary Redesign of Worldviews, Institutions, and Technologies, 106 PNAS 2483, 2486 (2009);
DAVID W. ORR, HOPE IS AN IMPERATIVE 151 (2011); Geoffrey Garver, The Rule of Ecological Law:
The Legal Complement to Degrowth Economics, 5 SUSTAINABILITY 316, 325 (2013).
110 See William E. Rees, Globalization and Sustainability: Conflict or Convergence?, BULLE-
TIN OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & SOC’Y 22 (Aug. 2002).
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opportunity to envelope trade and investment rules within ecological
constraints.
Like most national and sub-national systems of environmental
law,111 the international policy on trade and environment has focused
policy ambitions and, more rarely, legally binding action on discrete en-
vironmental impacts rather than on a comprehensive, systems-based and
holistic approach for monitoring and decreasing aggregated and cross-
scale ecological effects.  One well known tool for tracking aggregate
ecological impacts of human activity is the ecological footprint,112 which
is “a comprehensive sustainability metric that aims to capture all aspects
of human consumption that derive from mutually exclusive bioproduc-
tive areas.”113  In the North American context, despite a JPAC recom-
mendation in 2010 to “develop common metrics for tracking progress on
greening the economy, such as ecological footprint, material and energy
flow accounts, or other appropriate measures,”114 neither Canada, Mex-
ico nor the United States, nor the CEC, yet frames comprehensive poli-
cies around bringing the countries’ or the region’s ecological footprint,
or other holistic metric of ecological impact, back to ecologically sus-
tainable levels.115  Although the per capita and total ecological footprint
in North America has stabilized or slightly decreased since the 1990s,116
the region’s total and per capita footprints remain among the highest
111 See generally Garver, The Rule of Ecological Law, supra note 109.
112 Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees developed the leading ecological footprint meth-
odology in the mid-1990s. MATHIS WACKERNAGEL & WILLIAM E. REES, OUR ECOLOGICAL FOOT-
PRINT: REDUCING HUMAN IMPACT ON THE EARTH (1996). See also generally GLOBAL FOOTPRINT
NETWORK, https://www.footprintnetwork.org.
113 David Lin et al., Ecological Footprint Accounting for Countries: Updates and Results of
the National Footprint Accounts, 2012-2018, 7 RESOURCES 58, at 16.
114 JPAC, Advice to Council 10-03 - The Strategic Plan of the Commission for Environmen-
tal Cooperation 2010-2015, at 3-4 (October 8, 2010), http://www.cec.org/files/documents/
jpac_advice_council/jpac-advice-10-03-en.pdf. The JPAC advised: “Given that the sustainable eco-
logical footprint is estimated to be about 2 hectares person globally and the North American average
is about 7.8 hectares per person (9.4 in the U.S., 7.1 in Canada and 3.4 in Mexico), greening the
economy must be about greatly increasing the efficiency of material and energy use in North
America.” The Council never responded to this advice.
115 Some federal agencies, states, provinces and local governments do make marginal use of
ecological footprint. See, e.g., Empreinte écologique du Québec, Rapport du Commissaire du
développement durable, 2007-08 (2008); GLOBAL FOOTPRINT NETWORK, San Francisco, Case Stud-
ies (Aug. 15, 2011), https://www.footprintnetwork.org/2011/08/15/san-francisco-looks-footprint-2/;
GLOBAL FOOTPRINT NETWORK, The Ecological Footprint and Biocapacity of California (Mar. 2013),
http://footprintnetwork.org/images/article_uploads/EcologicalFootprint BiocapacityOf-
California_2013.pdf.; GLOBAL FOOTPRINT NETWORK, Calgary, Case Studies (Apr. 10, 2015), https://
www.footprintnetwork.org/2015/04/10/calgary/; GLOBAL FOOTPRINT NETWORK, Vancouver kicks off
neighborhood Footprint Campaign (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.footprintnetwork.org/2017/02/20/
vancouver-kicks-off-neighborhood-footprint-campaign/; GLOBAL FOOTPRINT NETWORK, State of the
States Report (July 14, 2015), https://www.footprintnetwork.org/2015/07/14/states/.
116 Lin et al., supra note 107, at 11.
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globally and require a drastic decrease.  Instead of tracking and respond-
ing to aggregate, holistic indicators like ecological footprint, the reduc-
tionist and fragmented approach to environmental policy in North
America, which is particularly weak in the international trade and invest-
ment context, implicitly and unjustifiably relies on the thermodynami-
cally flawed assumption that economic growth will yield technological
innovations that will sufficiently increase the efficiency of material and
energy throughput to address aggregate ecological concerns.117
Simply put, the weak environmental safeguards in the NAFTA
model, even with modifications in its replacement, the CUSMA-
USMCA, and other post-NAFTA trade and investment agreements, are
insufficient to regulate the drivers of ecological pressures associated with
increasing international exchange of goods and services and strong pro-
tection of foreign investments.  Worse, even those weak provisions have
not been adequately implemented.  Again, this failing approach to envi-
ronmental regulation of trade and investment is hard-wired into policy,
not only in North America but globally.
B. THE NEED FOR STRONGER ADVOCACY FOR COUNTER-NARRATIVES
TO THE NAFTA AND POST-NAFTA FRAMING OF TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT
A strong, united shift in the positions of North American environ-
mental NGOs could help shift public debate, and ultimately trade policy,
to align it better with a rigorous response to the region’s and the world’s
looming ecological crisis.118  In 1993, environmental NGOs in North
America were divided on the merits of the trade and environment com-
promise that resulted from President Clinton’s insistence on labor and
environment side agreements to the final NAFTA text that he inher-
ited.119  The Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, the Humane Society,
Greenpeace, the Council of Canadians, and Public Citizen were promi-
nent groups insisting that NAFTA and the NAAEC did not go far enough
in protecting the environment, pointing in particular to the chilling effect
117 For examples of unsubstantiated assumptions that GDP growth will lead to environmental
improvements, see JEFFREY D. SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A SMALL PLANET (2008);
UNEP, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication
– A Synthesis for Policymakers (2011), https://www.unep.org/resources/report/pathways-sustaina-
ble-development-and-poverty-eradication.
118 See Robert Housman, The North American Free Trade Agreement’s Lessons for Recon-
ciling Trade and the Environment, 30 STANFORD J. INT’L L. 379, 390 (1994) (“international alliances
among environmental groups are vital to advancing an environmental agenda in trade fora”).
119 NAFTA was negotiated and signed during the Bush Administration, but it had not yet
received Congressional approval when the Clinton Administration took over in January 1993.
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that Chapter 11 and other NAFTA provisions could have on effective
environmental regulation and enforcement.120  The Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC), the Audubon Society, the Center for Interna-
tional Environmental Law (CIEL), the Environmental Defense Fund
(EDF), Conservation International, the National Wildlife Federation
(NWF), and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) sided with the Clinton
Administration and supported Congressional ratification of NAFTA in
light of the NAAEC.121
International trade is undeniably an intricate part of a globalized
economy that is exacting a mounting and critical toll on Earth’s ecosys-
tems.  The precise contribution of NAFTA to regional and global ecolog-
ical impacts is impossible to determine, and some of the worst
environmental fears about NAFTA (such as massive environmental
dumping to less developed countries due primarily to laxer environmen-
tal law) have not materialized.  However, the general demise and neglect
of many of NAFTA’s and the NAAEC’s environmental provisions, such
as the SEM process, should warrant some consternation on the part of the
environmental NGOs that supported NAFTA.  A search of the EDF,
NWF, Conservation International, National Audubon Society122 and
WWF websites for USMCA or NAFTA returned no results regarding the
renegotiation of NAFTA, and those organizations no longer have active
work programs regarding trade.  CIEL has an active work program on
international trade and investment and signed onto statements by several
environmental NGOs opposing “Trump’s NAFTA 2.0”.123  NRDC fo-
cused its attention during NAFTA’s renegotiation on the failure to in-
clude the Paris Climate Agreement in the CUSMA-USMCA, and also
submitted a comment to the House Ways and Means Committee in June
2019 calling for stronger enforcement mechanisms for the new agree-
120 See Keith Schneider, Environment Groups Are Split on Support For Free-Trade Pact,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993, at A1; Annette Baker Fox, Environment and Trade: The NAFTA Case,
110 POL. SCIENCE Q. 49, 64-66 (1995); Council of Canadians v. Canada (Attorney General), [2006]
OJ No 4751, 277 DLR (4th) 527 (Ont. C.A.).
121 See Schneider, supra note 120; Fox, supra note 120. However, CIEL, NRDC and the
Audubon Society filed an amicus brief in support of Public Citizen’s unsuccessful litigation to sub-
ject NAFTA to environmental impact assessment under NEPA. CTR. FOR INT’L ENV’T L. (CIEL),
1993 Annual Report (1994), http://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CIEL_Report
_1993.pdf.
122 But see Raillan Brooks, New Trade Agreements Gut Environmental Protections, AUDU-
BON (July-Aug. 2014), https://www.audubon.org/magazine/july-august-2014/new-trade-agreements-
gut-environmental (last visited Mar. 26, 2021).
123 See Press Release, Sierra Club et al., New NAFTA Deal Threatens Our Air, Water, and
Climate, CIEL (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.ciel.org/news/new-nafta-threatens-air-water-climate
(last visited Mar. 26, 2021); Sierra Club et al., NAFTA Talks Have Ignored Environmental Concerns
(May 16, 2018), https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/uploads-wysiwig/
NAFTA%20Environmental%20Letter%20May%202018.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2021).
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ment’s environmental provisions.124  The groups that opposed NAFTA
in 1993 by and large also opposed the CUSMA-USMCA.125
The Council of Canadians, perhaps the most consistent Canadian
organization raising concerns about trade liberalization and globalization,
concisely captured the central idea around which environmental groups
and other civil society groups in North America and beyond should coa-
lesce and rally:  “As trade and globalization contribute to the climate
crisis, it is vital to have a new NAFTA agreement that not only doesn’t
worsen the crisis, but contributes to addressing it.”126  Of course, it is not
just the global climate that is facing dire threats from human economic
activity, but many of the features of regional and global ecosystem func-
tioning that are reflected by planetary boundaries.  The ecological limits
that planetary boundaries of safe operating space represent are not a
straitjacket that will lead to human misery and deprivation, but a set of
guidelines that offer “the flexibility to choose a myriad of pathways for
human well-being and development.”127  The increasingly sophisticated
development of “doughnut economics,” which combines the planetary
boundaries with a set of criteria for establishing a social baseline for just
and equitable societies, is showing ever more clearly what these path-
ways look like.128  The challenge, then is to start with structures based on
planetary boundaries and doughnut economics, or similar ecologically-
limited models, and then consider what kind of trade and investment
makes sense.  The outdated CUSMA-USMCA approach is still firmly
grounded in a completely inverse logic that no longer makes sense in a
world in ecological crisis.
IV. CONCLUSION
As climate change, biodiversity loss and other urgent ecological cri-
ses facing North America and the rest of world worsen, the failure of
124 See NRDC, Press Release: NAFTA Rewrite Fails Key Climate Test (Dec. 9, 2019), https:/
/www.nrdc.org/media/2019/191209  (last visited Mar. 26, 2021); NRDC& Sierra Club, Comment
letter to the House Ways and Means Committee on “Enforcement in the New NAFTA” (June 5,
2019),  https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/comment-house-ways-and-means-nafta-enforcement-
06052019.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2021).
125 See Brooks, supra note 121; Sierra Club et al., supra note 122.
126 Council of Canadians, CUSMA – The “New” NAFTA, https://canadians.org/nafta (last
visited Mar. 25, 2021).
127 Johan Rockström et al., Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for
Humanity, 14 ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY 32, 2009, at 6, http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/
art32/ES-2009-3180.pdf.
128 See generally KATE RAWORTH, DOUGHNUT ECONOMICS: SEVEN WAYS TO THINK LIKE A
21ST CENTURY ECONOMIST (2017). Amsterdam is working to apply doughnut economics to a large
urban center. Daniel Boffey, Amsterdam to embrace ‘doughnut’ model to mend post-coronavirus
economy, GUARDIAN, Apr. 8, 2020.
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contemporary law to regulate the human activities that drive this global
change is becoming more and more apparent.  International trade and
environment agreements like NAFTA and the CUSMA-USMCA are in-
tended to increase economic activity that, despite some improvements in
resource efficiency, inevitably builds pressure on the ecosystems that
sustain humanity.  Environmental law is subservient to this approach to
provisioning human societies, a weak cousin to the laws and policies that
protect rights to produce and consume and support endless economic
growth.129  Alternatives to managing the social metabolism of humanity
are not only possible, but critically necessary.  To pursue those alterna-
tives, ecologically-limited approaches to law are essential, in which only
options for trade, investment and other economic activity that respect
planetary boundaries such as climate change are allowed.  The Paris Cli-
mate Agreement is an outlier in environmental law, because its founda-
tional goal of limiting global heating to 1.5 degrees C is based on
ecological limits, rather than on technological or economic feasibility.
Whether the nations of the world take that goal seriously and achieve it
remains to be seen, but the agreement includes mechanisms for tighter
requirements over time.  The CUSMA-USMCA, which completely ig-
nored the Paris agreement, employs an outdated and failing approach to
integrating trade and the environment and falls far short of meeting 21st
century ecological challenges.  It is a tragic lost opportunity.  It is past
due time for civil society, the broader public and ultimately the nations
of the world to unite around an ecological approach to trade that leaves
the NAFTA and CUSMA-USMCA approach in the bins of history.
129 See Ecological Law and Governance Association (ELGA), Oslo Manifesto for Ecological
Law and Governance (June 2016), https://elgaworld.org/oslo-manifesto (last visited Mar. 26, 2021),
which states:
Among the flaws of environmental law are its anthropocentric, fragmented and reduc-
tionist characteristics. It is not only blind to ecological interdependencies, but also polit-
ically weak as it competes with other, more powerful areas of law such as individualized
property and corporate rights. As a consequence, the legal system has become im-
balanced and unable to secure the physical and biological conditions, upon which all
human and other life depends.
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